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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2371 
_____________ 
 
ANDREW CARMAN and KAREN CARMAN, 
     Appellants 
v. 
 
JEREMY CARROLL 
              
_____________ 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(No. 3:10-cv-01013) 
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley 
_____________ 
 
Argued: December 17, 2013 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, Circuit Judge, and 
SCHILLER, District Judge.
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 Honorable Berle M. Schiller, United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by 
designation. 
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(Opinion Filed: May 15, 2014) 
 
Barry H. Dyller, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Kelly A. Bray, Esq. 
88 North Franklin Street 
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701 
 
Attorneys for Appellants Andrew Carman and Karen Carman 
 
Kathleen G. Kane 
Sean A. Kirkpatrick [ARGUED] 
John G. Knorr, III 
Office of Attorney General 
Appellate Litigation Section 
15th Floor, Strawberry Square 
Harrisburg, PA 17120 
 
Attorneys for Appellee Jeremy Carroll 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Responding to a police dispatch, Pennsylvania State 
Trooper Jeremy Carroll and another trooper proceeded to the 
home of Andrew and Karen Carman to search for a man who 
had stolen two loaded handguns and a car with New Jersey 
plates. Upon arriving at the Carmans’ residence, the troopers 
bypassed the front door and went directly to the back of the 
house and onto a deck adjoining the kitchen. On the deck, a 
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scuffle ensued between Carroll and Andrew Carman. This 
§ 1983 action arises from Carroll’s warrantless entry onto the 
Carmans’ property. Carroll contends that he did not violate 
the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights because he entered 
into their curtilage, the area immediately surrounding their 
home, while executing a legitimate “knock and talk” 
encounter. Because Carroll proceeded directly through the 
back of the Carmans’ property and did not begin his visit at 
the front door, the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant 
requirement does not apply. Therefore, we reverse the District 
Court’s denial of the Carmans’ motion for judgment as a 
matter of law on their unlawful entry claim. We affirm the 
jury verdict regarding the Carmans’ unlawful seizure claim 
because there was sufficient support for the jury’s finding that 
Carroll acted reasonably.
2
 Accordingly, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the judgment of the District Court. 
 
                                              
2
 In reviewing a jury verdict, “[w]e are not free to weigh the 
evidence or to pass on the credibility of witnesses,” but rather 
“[o]ur function is to determine only whether there is evidence 
upon which the jury could properly return a verdict, viewing 
the evidence most favorably to . . . the non-movant, and 
giving [the non-movant] the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences.” Kinnel v. Mid-Atlantic Mausoleums, Inc., 850 
F.2d 958, 961-62 (3d Cir. 1988). Therefore, we construe the 
facts in the light most favorable to Carroll, the non-movant. 
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I. 
 
A. 
 
 In July 2009, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers 
Jeremy Carroll and Brian Roberts were dispatched to the 
Carmans’ residence to search for a man named Michael Zita 
and a car bearing New Jersey license plates. The troopers 
were told that Zita had stolen the car, was armed with two 
loaded handguns, and might have fled to the Carmans’ 
residence. Neither Roberts nor Carroll had been to the 
Carmans’ property before, and neither knew what Zita looked 
like. The troopers did not have a warrant to search the 
Carmans’ property nor did they have a warrant to arrest Zita.  
 
 The Carmans’ house sits on a corner lot. The main 
street runs along the front of the house and a side street runs 
along the left of the house, as viewed from the front. A 
clearly marked path leads to the front door. See Pl.’s Exs. 22, 
26.
3
 There is no other marked path to the Carmans’ house. A 
stone parking area is located on the left side of the house, see 
Pl.’s Ex. 25, and a shed and carport, which the parties refer to 
as a “garage,” are located in the Carmans’ backyard.  
 
 The Carmans also have a back deck that adjoins their 
kitchen area. See Pl.’s Ex. 18, 21. Two sets of stairs lead up to 
the deck, and a sliding glass door by the deck leads to the 
kitchen. See id. However, the Carmans testified that visitors 
use the front entrance when they come to visit.  
 
                                              
3
 For ease of reference, various photographs introduced at 
trial are appended to this Opinion. 
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 When the troopers arrived at the Carmans’ home, 
Andrew and Karen Carman were sitting in their kitchen with 
Karen Carman’s sister; they were the only people present at 
the home. Because there was no parking in front of the 
Carmans’ house, the troopers drove down the side street, 
passed numerous cars parked along the side of the Carmans’ 
house, and parked their cars at the first available spot, at “the 
far rear of the property.” App. 79. The troopers then got out 
of their cars, entered the Carmans’ backyard, and headed 
toward the garage. Carroll purportedly took this route because 
he saw a light on in the garage and thought someone might be 
there. He “poked [his] head in” the garage “and said, 
Pennsylvania State Police,” but “there was nobody in there.” 
App. 80. 
 
Carroll thought the sliding door attached to the back 
deck of the house “looked like a customary entryway.” App. 
92. Thus, after searching the garage and finding no one there, 
he and Roberts continued walking through the backyard and 
proceeded to the back deck. As the troopers stepped onto the 
deck, Andrew Carman came out of the house. Carman was 
belligerent and aggressively approached the troopers, asking, 
“Who the fuck are you?” App. 63, 80-81. Given Carman’s 
behavior, Carroll thought the man he was speaking with 
might be Zita. Carroll informed him that they were looking 
for Zita and asked Carman to identify himself. Carman 
refused to divulge his identity, made a quick turn away from 
the troopers, and appeared to reach for his waist, bringing his 
hands outside the troopers’ view. Still unsure of Carman’s 
identity, Carroll feared that Carman might be reaching for a 
weapon. He, therefore, momentarily grabbed Carman’s right 
arm. Upon seeing that Carman was unarmed, he let go. 
Carman twisted and fell off the deck. 
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 Karen Carman subsequently exited her house and 
came onto the deck with her sister. The two women were 
screaming when they approached Roberts. Consequently, 
Roberts ordered them to stand back and drew his Taser. 
Karen Carman asked the troopers what was going on, and 
Carroll explained that they were looking for Zita and asked 
her if they could search the house for him. She gave her 
consent and everyone went into the house.  
 
 The troopers searched the Carmans’ house and did not 
find Zita. The stolen vehicle was not at the Carmans’ 
residence, and the Carmans were not charged with any 
crimes.  
 
B. 
 
 Andrew and Karen Carman brought this case pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Carroll violated their 
Fourth Amendment rights. In particular, the Carmans’ two-
count complaint alleged that Carroll’s warrantless entry into 
their backyard, garage, back deck, and home constituted an 
unlawful search and that Carroll unreasonably seized Andrew 
Carman. Before trial, the Carmans advised the District Court 
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florida v. Jardines, 
133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), and asserted that they should be 
entitled to a directed verdict at trial based on that case. They 
also submitted a proposed jury instruction regarding the 
“knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement; their 
instruction cited heavily to Jardines.  
 
 The District Court conducted a two-day jury trial. 
After opening arguments, the Carmans moved for a directed 
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verdict, effectively a judgment as a matter of law, on their 
unlawful entry claim.
4
 At the close of Carroll’s testimony, the 
Carmans renewed their request for judgment as a matter of 
law on the unlawful entry claim and also moved for judgment 
as a matter of law on their unreasonable seizure claim. Carroll 
moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Carmans’ 
unlawful entry claim on the ground that he was entitled to 
qualified immunity. The District Court denied all of the 
motions without explanation.  
 
 The District Court also rejected the Carmans’ proposed 
jury instruction regarding the “knock and talk” exception. 
Over the Carmans’ objections, the District Court charged the 
jury with a different instruction; the District Court’s 
instruction cited language from our decision in Estate of 
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003), but did not 
cite Jardines.  
 
                                              
4
 As a result of the 1991 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(a), the term “directed verdict” has been 
abandoned and replaced with the term “judgment as a matter 
of law.” Therefore, we construe the parties’ motions for a 
directed verdict as motions for judgment as a matter of law 
under Rule 50(a). See Wittekamp v. Gulf & W., Inc., 991 F.2d 
1137, 1141 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The parties’ briefs have 
referred to the motion as seeking a directed verdict, but the 
motion more appropriately is termed a motion for judgment 
as a matter of law because the 1991 revision to Rule 50(a) 
abandoned the term ‘directed verdict.’”). 
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 Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict finding in 
Carroll’s favor on both claims. Judgment was entered on 
April 10, 2013. This appeal followed.
5
 
 
II. 
 
 On appeal, the Carmans argue that the District Court 
erred in denying their motions for judgment as a matter of law 
on their Fourth Amendment unlawful entry and unreasonable 
seizure claims. The Carmans also argue that the District Court 
provided an erroneous jury instruction regarding the “knock 
and talk” exception to the warrant requirement. 
 
A. 
 
 The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth 
Amendment, a search occurs when the government: (1) 
                                              
5
 We have jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s denial of 
judgment as a matter of law. Moyer v. United Dominion 
Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 545 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007). Such a 
motion “should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no 
question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other 
than the one directed would be erroneous under the governing 
law.” Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 63 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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physically intrudes on constitutionally protected areas, see 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414, or (2) invades “a subjective 
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable,” 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). Accord Jardines, 
133 S. Ct. at 1417 (“The Katz reasonable-expectations test 
‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional 
property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment . . . 
.” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 
(2012))). 
 
 “It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that 
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 586 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule 
is “subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357). We “regard 
the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the 
home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the 
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” Jardines, 133 
S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
180 (1984)); see also Marasco, 318 F.3d at 518 (“Fourth 
Amendment protections extend not only to a person’s home, 
but also to the curtilage surrounding the property.”). Thus, we 
presume a warrantless search of curtilage to be unreasonable.  
 
B. 
 
 From the moment that Carroll entered the Carmans’ 
backyard, he was in the curtilage surrounding their house. It 
is undisputed that Carroll entered into the Carmans’ curtilage 
without a warrant, without consent, and without exigent 
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circumstances. Carroll argues that he nonetheless did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because he entered the 
Carmans’ property while conducting a “knock and talk.” As 
he correctly points out, a “knock and talk” encounter is a 
permitted exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, 
we assess whether this exception applies to this case. 
 
 Under the “knock and talk” exception, “a police officer 
not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, 
precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen 
might do.’” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Kentucky v. 
King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)); see also Marasco, 318 
F.3d at 519 (“Officers are allowed to knock on a residence’s 
door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to 
the inhabitants just as any private citizen may.”). Needless to 
say, government officers cannot benefit from the “knock and 
talk” exception simply because they knock on a door. For 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a “knock and talk” is a 
brief, consensual encounter that begins at the entrance used 
by visitors, which in most circumstances is the front door.
6
 A 
“knock and talk” encounter must satisfy three requirements. 
 
 First, a police officer, like any visitor, must “knock 
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent 
invitation to linger longer) leave.” See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 
1415.  
 
                                              
6
 We recognize that there may be some instances in which the 
front door is not the entrance used by visitors. Despite 
Carroll’s argument to the contrary, this is not one such 
instance. 
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 Second, the purpose of a “knock and talk” must be to 
interview the occupants of a home, not to conduct a search. 
See id. at 1416 n.4 (“[I]t is not a Fourth Amendment search to 
approach the home in order to speak with the occupant, 
because all are invited to do that. . . . But no one is impliedly 
invited to enter the protected premises of the home in order to 
do nothing but conduct a search.”); Marasco, 318 F.3d at 520 
(noting that the “knock and talk” exception may apply 
“[w]here officers are pursuing a lawful objective, 
unconnected to any search for the fruits and instrumentalities 
of criminal activity” (emphasis added)). In Jardines, for 
example, the officer’s entry into the curtilage violated the 
Fourth Amendment because his “behavior objectively 
reveal[ed] a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what 
anyone would think he had license to do.” 133 S. Ct. at 1417. 
 
 Third, a “knock and talk” encounter must begin at the 
front door because that is where police officers, like any other 
visitors, have an implied invitation to go. It is well settled that 
“the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or 
license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by 
solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.” Id. at 1415 
(quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). This implied invitation 
“typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the 
front path . . . . Complying with the terms of that traditional 
invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is 
generally managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl 
Scouts and trick-or-treaters.” Id. at 1415. 
 
 Although officers have a right to knock at the front 
door while executing a “knock and talk,” this right does not 
“necessarily extend[] to the officers the right to enter 
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[elsewhere] into the curtilage.” Marasco, 318 F.3d at 520. In 
Marasco, we recognized that an officer’s entry into other 
parts of the curtilage “after not receiving an answer at the 
front door might be reasonable” in limited situations. Id. 
(emphasis added). However, we rejected the “sweeping 
proposition” that “officers may proceed to the back of a home 
when they do not receive an answer at the front door any time 
they have a legitimate purpose for approaching the house in 
the first place.” Id. at 519-20.  
 
 In this case, Carroll cannot avail himself of the “knock 
and talk” exception to the warrant requirement because he 
entered the back of the Carmans’ property without 
approaching the front door first. Carroll contends that the 
layout of the Carmans’ property “made the back door the 
most expedient and direct access to the house from where the 
troopers had to park.” Carroll Br. at 18. While it may have 
been more convenient for the troopers to cut through the 
backyard and knock on the back door, the Fourth Amendment 
is not grounded in expediency. The “knock and talk” 
exception requires that police officers begin their encounter at 
the front door, where they have an implied invitation to go. 
This exception does not license officers to bypass the front 
door and enter other parts of the curtilage based on where 
they park their cars. Because Carroll did not knock on the 
Carmans’ front door, but instead proceeded directly through 
the back of their property, his intrusion cannot be justified as 
a “knock and talk.” Accordingly, Carroll’s warrantless entry 
into the Carmans’ curtilage violated the Fourth Amendment 
as a matter of law.  
C. 
 
 Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government 
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officials are shielded from civil liability for conduct that does 
not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Therefore, 
in determining whether Carroll is entitled to qualified 
immunity for violating the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment 
rights, we must decide whether these rights were “clearly 
established at the time of [Carroll’s] alleged misconduct. 
Qualified immunity is applicable unless [his] conduct violated 
a clearly established constitutional right.” See id. at 232 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
 
 “An individual’s Fourth Amendment interest in the 
curtilage of his home has been well settled for over a 
century.” Marasco, 318 F.3d at 521 n.13. Over a decade ago, 
in Marasco, we made clear that an officer’s right to knock at 
the front door while conducting a “knock and talk” does not 
carry a concomitant right to enter other parts of the curtilage. 
We established that “entry into the curtilage after not 
receiving an answer at the front door might be” justified 
under the “knock and talk” exception in limited situations. Id. 
at 520 (emphasis added). Because Carroll bypassed the front 
door completely, he exceeded the boundaries of the “knock 
and talk” exception. Based on Marasco, which pre-dated 
Carroll’s conduct, it was clearly established that the trooper’s 
warrantless entry into the Carmans’ curtilage violated their 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
 Therefore, we reverse the District Court’s denial of the 
Carmans’ motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect 
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to their unlawful entry claim.
7
  
 
D. 
 
We next address Andrew Carman’s unreasonable 
seizure claim. It is undisputed that Carroll seized Carman 
when he grabbed Carman’s arm. Thus, the relevant question 
is whether there was a “minimum quantum of evidence from 
which the jury could have rationally reached [its] verdict” that 
the seizure was reasonable. See Dutton v. Wolpoff & 
Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 653 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 
“[S]ubject only to a few well-defined exceptions, 
warrantless . . . seizures are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 
347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Ross, 466 
U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982)). However, “an officer may, 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, 
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Id. 
(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a 
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts 
known to the officer at the time.”). This right to conduct an 
                                              
7
 Because we hold that Carroll’s warrantless entry violated 
the Fourth Amendment, entitling the Carmans to judgment as 
a matter of law, we do not address the Carmans’ challenge to 
the District Court’s jury instructions. 
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“investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use 
some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect 
it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  
 
Based on the facts presented at trial, there was a 
“minimum quantum of evidence” from which a jury could 
rationally conclude that Carroll’s conduct was reasonable. 
Carroll testified that he was unsure of Carman’s identity at 
the time, did not know whether he was dealing with Zita, and 
did not know why this unidentified man approached him and 
Roberts with such hostility. Thus, a jury could rationally find 
that Carroll had reasonable suspicion to momentarily question 
Carman to ascertain his identity. Moreover, based on 
Carroll’s testimony that he thought Carman might be an 
armed car thief and feared that the man was reaching for a 
weapon, a jury could rationally find that Carroll was justified 
in momentarily grabbing Carman’s arm to effectuate a stop. 
Because the facts provide a minimum amount of evidence to 
support the jury’s finding that Carroll acted reasonably, we 
affirm the jury verdict on the unreasonable seizure claim.  
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the judgment of the District Court. As to the 
unlawful entry claim, we reverse the District Court’s denial of 
the Carmans’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. We 
remand the case with the direction that judgment be entered 
in the Carmans’ favor and that a new trial be ordered with 
respect to damages. As to the unreasonable seizure claim, we 
affirm the jury verdict and the District Court’s denial of 
judgment as a matter of law. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   EXHIBITS TO OPINION 
Case: 13-2371     Document: 003111319249     Page: 251      Date Filed: 07/10/2013
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
J'S' 
Case: 13-2371     Document: 003111319249     Page: 254      Date Filed: 07/10/2013
i PLAINTIFF'S i EXHIBIT I d I 
Case: 13-2371     Document: 003111319249     Page: 255      Date Filed: 07/10/2013
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
;);) 
Case: 13-2371     Document: 003111319249     Page: 257      Date Filed: 07/10/2013
' PLAINTIFF'S 
~ EXHIBIT 
~ ;25 I _.;:;...:.....<...--
Case: 13-2371     Document: 003111319249     Page: 258      Date Filed: 07/10/2013
! PLAINnFPS 
~ EXHIBIT I ~(p 
